The Sweet, Sickly Stench Of QE ‘Success’

Six years ago, hardly anybody outside financial circles had any idea what Quantitative Easing was – hell, many within financial circles had no idea what QE entailed.
The Fed, and the BoE did the heavy lifting in explaining it to Western audiences (Japan had been doing it so long that its citizens were bored of it and paid little attention when iterations 16, 17 and 18 were rolled out in recent years) with then-Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, leading the way as only he could:
(Jackson Hole Speech, 2010): The channels through which the Fed’s purchases affect longer-term interest rates and financial conditions more generally have been subject to debate. I see the evidence as most favorable to the view that such purchases work primarily through the so-called portfolio balance channel, which holds that once short- term interest rates have reached zero, the Federal Reserve’s purchases of longer-term securities affect financial conditions by changing the quantity and mix of financial assets held by the public.
Specifically, the Fed’s strategy relies on the presumption that different financial assets are not perfect substitutes in investors’ portfolios, so that changes in the net supply of an asset available to investors affect its yield and those of broadly similar assets. Thus, our purchases of Treasury, agency debt, and agency MBS likely both reduced the yields on those securities and also pushed investors into holding other assets with similar characteristics, such as credit risk and duration. For example, some investors who sold MBS to the Fed may have replaced them in their portfolios with longer-term, high-quality corporate bonds, depressing the yields on those assets as well.
Yeah, I know.
Others took a swing at explaining QE in terms more accessible to the layman (and woman):

This post was published at Zero Hedge on 08/06/2015.